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Abstract—Throughout the past decade, there has been an
extensive research on scheduling the hospital resources such
as the operation theatre(s) (OTs) and the experts (such as
nurses, doctors etc.) inside the hospitals. With the technological
growth, mainly advancement in communication media (such as
smart phones, video conferencing, smart watches etc.) one may
think of taking the expertise by the doctors (distributed around
the globe) from outside the in-house hospitals. Earlier this
interesting situation of hiring doctors from outside the hospitals
has been studied from monetary (with patient having infinite
budget) and non-monetary perspectives in strategic setting. In
this paper, the more realistic situation is studied in terms of
hiring the doctors from outside the hospital when a patient is
constrained by budget. Our proposed mechanisms follow the
two pass mechanism design framework each consisting of allo-
cation rule and payment rule. Through simulations, we evaluate
the performance and validate our proposed mechanisms.
Keywords-e-healthcare; hiring doctors; budget; truthful
I. Introduction
Substantial literatures are available to schedule resources
inside the hospitals in healthcare system [1][2][3][4]. How-
ever, how to hire (to schedule) resources (expert consultants
(ECs) etc.) along with their pricing schemes from outside the
hospitals are mostly unaddressed [5][6][7][8]. It is observed
that, with the prodigious growth of the communication
media (say video conferencing, Internet, smart
phones etc.), it may be an usual phenomena to have the
consultancies by the experts (especially doctors) from out-
side the hospital(s). It is to be noted that the doctors can pro-
vide consultancies by being present at the consultancy spot
(where the patient is admitted) particularly virtually (using
video conferencing, Internet, smart phones
etc.) etc. making them pervasive. In our future references
ECs and doctors will be used interchangeably. In this paper,
an attempt is made to hire expert consultants from outside
the hospital when a patient is budget limited. The detailing
of the hiring concept in this paper is shown in Figure 1. In
our model, the hiring concept is shown as a two fold process.
In the first fold, the accumulated hospital’s budget can be
utilized to detect the leaders in the social graph (representing
ECs professional connections) to inform about the hiring
concept to the substantial number of doctors.
B
B
B
B
T
c¯1
c¯2
c¯3
c¯4
c¯n−1
c¯n}
Doctors influencing phase
{ Doctors selection phase
c¯1
c¯2
c¯3
c¯4
c¯n
c¯n−1
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
s6
s7
s8
s9
s10
s11
sm−2
sm−3
sm−1
sm
s1
s2
s3
s4
sn−1
sn
Hospital
···
···
Hiring
Doctors
B′
Patient
B′
c1
c2
c3
c8
c9
c5
c4
c10
c7
c6
cm
cm−1
cm−2
cm−3
Figure 1: System model
In the second fold, the subset of doctors will be selected
from the set consisting of doctors as leaders and the in-
formed doctors for the consultancy process, such that the
total payment made to the doctors is within patient’s budget.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II elucidates the related works. Section III describes our
proposed model. The proposed mechanisms are illustrated
in section IV. The analysis of the proposed mechanisms are
illustrated in section V. In section VI experiments and results
are shown. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
II. Related prior work
In past the handful of works have been done, focusing
on scheduling inside the hospitals (or internal scheduling)
in terms of operation theatres (OTs) scheduling [9][1][2][10]
and internal staffs (such as nurses [3][11], physicians [12][4]
etc.) scheduling. In [13][10] the works have been done for
allocating OTs on time to increase OTs efficiency. In our fu-
ture references, hospital(s), medical unit(s), organization(s)
will be used interchangeably. As with the enhancement in
the technologies, mainly communication media (say video
conferencing, Internet, smart phones etc.), it may be an
usual phenomena to think of the scheduling of medical staffs
(mainly doctors) outside the in-house hospital [5][6][14].
In [5] a doctor is providing the expertise through video
conferencing to a patient admitted to other hospital with
prior contact. In [15] the context of the patient (such as
age, sex, medical report etc.) is utilized to take the expertise
of the doctors from outside the admitted hospitals in non-
strategic setting. In [6] the strategic case is considered and
is solved using mechanism design with money and in [7][8]
mechanism design without money is utilized. Despite some
progress in the scenario of hiring ECs from outside the
hospital(s), the patients with budget constraints case has
been largely overlooked. In this paper, the problem of hiring
doctors from outside the hospital is studied in this setting.
III. System model
A. Notation and Preliminaries
In this section, we formalize the doctors hiring problem
where the multiple doctors are hired from outside of the
hospital, for a patient having budgetB′. The patient’s budget
B′ is a public information. The hospital to which a patient is
admitted is having an accumulated, publicly known budget
B, which will be utilized to inform about the hiring concept
to the substantial number of ECs. The set of ECs is given
as S = {s1, s2, . . . , sm}; where each EC si ∈ S is assumed
to be professionally connected with some χi ⊆ S\{si}.
The professional connections are given by a social graph
G(V,E), whereV is the set of nodes representing ECs and E
is the set of edges representing their professional connections
in the social graph. Each si is associated with a hospital
~i ∈ H . Our model consists of two fold process. In the
first fold, there is a social graph that is represented
as G(V,E) and publicly known expert consultant activation
function given as I : 2S → R≥0. Given the subset Γ ⊆ S the
value I(Γ) represents the expected number of doctors that
are made aware about the hiring concept i.e. I(Γ) = |
⋃
i∈Γ
χi|.
Each node in the graph represents a doctor si that has
a private cost (aka bid) ci of being an initial adapter or
the cost for spreading awareness about the hiring concept
to other doctors. The cost vector of all the m doctors is
given as: C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm}. It is to be noted that, the
ECs are rational and strategic in nature. It means
that, the ECs can gain by misreporting their private cost.
As the ECs are strategic; so each si ∈ S may report
their cost for being an initial adapter as c′
i
instead of ci
in order to gain; where c′
i
, ci. The payment vector for
the set Γ is given as PΓ = {PΓ1 ,PΓ2 , . . . ,PΓk }; where PΓi
is the payment of si ∈ Γ. The objective of the first fold
is to maximize the expert consultant activation function
while the total payment is at most hospital’s budget B. In
the second fold, we have a set of doctors consisting
of doctors acted as leaders in the first fold and the aware
doctors given as Sˆ = {s1, s2, . . . , si−1, si, . . . , sn} such that
n ≤ m. The quality vector of all the m ECs is given as
Q = {Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qm}, where Qi ∈ Q is the quality of i
th
doctor. In general, the quality Qi of a doctor si can be
estimated using various parameters calculated later in the
section. The publicly known quality function is given as
D : 2Sˆ → R≥0. Given a subset Υ ⊆ Sˆ, the value D(Υ)
denotes the sum of the qualities of all the doctors in Υ i.e.
D(Υ) =
∑
i∈Υ Qi. For this fold, each doctor si ∈ Sˆ will bid
afresh their cost (private) for providing consultancy to the
patient and is given as c¯i. The cost vector of all the n doctors
is given as: C¯ = {c¯1, c¯2, . . . , c¯n}. The strategic behaviour
of the doctors is continued in this fold also; so each si ∈ Sˆ
may report their cost of consultancy as c¯′
i
instead of c¯i in
order to gain; where c¯′
i
, c¯i. Our objective is to determine the
subset Υ ∈ {ξ|
∑
i∈ξ c¯i ≤ B
′} for which D(Υ) is maximized
and the total payment should not exceed the patient’s budget
B
′. The payment vector of the set Υ is given as Pˆ = {Pˆ1,
Pˆ2, . . . , Pˆr}.
B. Quality determination
The parameters that determine the quality of each doc-
tor si are: (1) qualification of si given as qi (2)
success rate of si given as sri (3) experience of
si given as ei (4) hospital to which si belong given
as ~i. So, the quality of doctor si is given as: Qi =
(w1 · qi + w2 · sri + w3 · ei + w4 · ~i); where, wi ∈ [0, 1] such
that
∑
i wi = 1. The weighted sum of the some of the
parameters considered in our case will result in the quality
of the doctors.
C. Budget distribution and utilization
In our scenario, each fold is utilizing the budget from
two independent sources. Firstly, talking about the hospital’s
budget it can be thought of as 1) the accumulated fund from
the previously admitted patients say adding 5-6% of the total
fees of each patients to the hospital fund. 2) Donation to
the hospital by high profile persons or communities. Next,
the source of the budget utilized in the second phase is the
patient itself.
Definition 1 (Marginal Contribution [16]). The marginal
contribution of an EC si ∈ S is the number of ECs informed
about the hiring concept by the EC si given the set of i − 1
ECs i.e. Γi−1 already selected as the leaders. Mathematically,
the marginal contribution of ith EC given Γi−1 is defined as:
MCi (Γi−1) = I (Γi−1 ∪ {si}) − I (Γi−1)
Definition 2 (Quality Contribution [17]). The quality con-
tribution of an EC si ∈ S given a subset Υi−1 of ECs already
been selected is given as:Di(Υi−1) = D(Υi−1∪{si})−D(Υi−1)
where D(Υi) denotes the sum of the qualities of all the
doctors in Υi i.e. D(Υi) =
∑
i Qi given Υi = {1, . . . , i} and
D(Υ0) = 0 as Υ0 = φ.
IV. Proposed mechanisms
In this section, we present proposed mechanisms: Non-
truthful budget constraint (NoTBC) mechanism motivated
by [18] and Truthful budget constraint (TBC) mechanism
motivated by [16][17].
A. NoTBC mechanism
It is a two pass mechanism consisting of Non-truthful
budget constraint leader identification (NoTBC-LI) mech-
anism and Non-truthful budget constraint doctor selection
(NoTBC-DS) mechanism.
1) NoTBC-LI mechanism: In each iteration of while loop,
a doctor with maximum marginal contribution per cost
among the available doctors is considered and is selected
only if its cost for being an initial adapter is less than the
hospital’s available budget. The payment of each doctors as
a leader is their revealed cost.
Algorithm 1 NoTBC-LI mechanism (G, S, B, C)
Output: Sˆ ← φ, PΓ ← φ
1: S¯ ← φ ⊲ Set containing all the informed doctors.
2: while S , φ do
3: si ← argmax j∈S
[
MC j (Γ j−1)
c j
]
4: if ci ≤ B then
5: Γ ← Γ ∪ {si}; S¯ ← S¯ ∪ {χi}; B← B − ci
6: end if
7: S ← S \ {si}
8: end while
9: Sˆ = Γ ∪ S¯
10: for each si ∈ Γ do
11: PΓi ← ci; PΓ ← PΓ ∪ {PΓi}
12: end for
13: return Sˆ, PΓ
2) NoTBC-DS mechanism: In each iteration of while
loop, a doctor with maximum quality contribution per cost
among the selected doctors by NoTBC-LI mechanism is
considered and is hired only if its cost for the consultancy
is less than the patient’s available budget. The payment of
each hired doctors is their revealed cost of consultancy.
Lemma 1. The NoTBC mechanism is computationally effi-
cient.
Proof: In NoTBC-LI, for m iteration of while loop we
have O(m2). Thus, the running time of NoTBC-LI is O(m2).
In NoTBC-DS, for m iteration (in worst case) of while loop
we have O(m2). Thus, the running time of NoTBC-DS is
O(m2). In both the cases, the payment determination will be
linear in m. Thus, the computational complexity of NoTBC
is given as O(m2).
Algorithm 2 NoTBC-DS mechanism (Sˆ, B′, C¯)
Output: Υ ← φ, Pˆ← φ
1: while Sˆ , φ do
2: si ← argmax j∈Sˆ
D j(Υ j−1)
c¯ j
3: if c¯i ≤ B
′ then
4: Υ ← Υ ∪ {si}; B
′ ← B′ − c¯i
5: end if
6: Sˆ ← Sˆ \ {si}
7: end while
8: for each si ∈ Υ do
9: Pˆi ← c¯i; Pˆ← Pˆ ∪ {Pˆi}
10: end for
11: return Υ, Pˆ
Lemma 2. The NoTBC mechanism is individually rational.
Proof: From line 11 of Algorithm 1, we can see PΓi =
ci for each si ∈ Γ. Line 9 in Algorithm 2 shows that Pˆi =
c¯i. Therefore, we have payment for any winner is its cost.
Hence, NoTBC mechanism is individually rational.
Lemma 3. The NoTBC mechanism is budget feasible.
Proof: As it is clear that a doctor is included in the
winning set only when the given condition in line 4 of
Algorithm 1 and line 3 of Algorithm 2 is satisfied. As
the payment in case of NoTBC is equal to the cost; the
total payment will be at most the budget. Hence, NoTBC
mechanism is budget feasible.
B. TBC mechanism
It is a two pass mechanism consisting of Truthful budget
constraint leader identification (TBC-LI) and Truthful
budget constraint doctor selection (TBC-DS) mechanisms.
1) TBC-LI mechanism: For first fold of hiring problem,
we propose a TBC-LI mechanism motivated by [16][17].
Allocation rule: In this, a doctor with maximum
marginal contribution per cost among the available doctors
Algorithm 3 TBC-LI allocation mechanism (G, S, B, C)
Output: Γ ← φ, Sˆ ← φ
1: S¯ ← φ; si ← argmax j∈S
[
MC j (Γ j−1)
c j
]
2: while ci ≤
B
2
(
MCi (Γi−1)
MCi (Γi−1)+I (Γi−1)
)
do
3: Γ ← Γ ∪ {si}; S¯ ← S¯ ∪ {χi}
4: si ← argmax j∈S\Γ
[
MC j (Γ j−1)
c j
]
5: end while
6: Sˆ = Γ ∪ S¯
7: return Γ and Sˆ
is considered. But the doctor is selected as the leader only
when the ratio between their cost as the initial adapter and
budget is less than or equal to half of the ratio between their
marginal contribution and the value of the selected subset.
Example 1(a): Figure 2a show the initial configuration of
the social graph along with cost distribution, and marginal
contribution (m.c.). The quality vector of the nodes is given
as: Q = {5, 1, 3, 5, 4, 5}. Higher the value, higher will
be the quality. For understanding purpose we are taking the
quality of the doctors as an integer value but in general it
may not be the case. It is to be noted that the unit of cost and
budget is taken as $. We have considered hospital’s budget
to be 10. Using line 1 of the Algorithm 3 the node 4 is
considered.
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(a) Initial configuration
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Figure 2: Detailed functioning of Algorithm 3
The condition 2 ≤ 5· ( 3
3+0
) for node 4 is satisfied. So, Γ = {4}
and S¯ = {3, 5, 6}. Next, node 3 will be considered and
2.5 ≤ 5· ( 3
3+3
) for node 3 is satisfied. So, Γ = {4, 3} and
S¯ = {3, 5, 6, 1, 2, 4}. So, we have Sˆ = {3, 5, 6, 1, 2, 4}.
Payment rule: The payment rule is motivated by [17].
Algorithm 4 TBC-LI pricing mechanism (Γ, B, C)
Output: PΓ ← φ.
1: Γ′ ← φ, S′ ← φ
2: for each si ∈ Γ do
3: S′ ← S \ {si}
4: s j ← argmaxk∈S′
[
MCk (Γ
′
k−1
)
ck
]
5: while c j ≤ B
(
MC j (Γ
′
j−1
)
MC j (Γ
′
j−1
)+I (Γ′
j−1
)
)
do
6: Γ′ ← Γ′ ∪ {s j} ⊲ Γ
′ is the set of leaders when
si is not in the market.
7: S′ ← S′ \ {s j}
8: s j ← argmaxk∈S′
[
MCk (Γ
′
k−1
)
ck
]
9: end while
10: Γ′ ← Γ′ ∪ {s j}
11: for each s j ∈ Γ
′ do
12: Calculate C
j
i
=
M
j
Ci
(Γ′
j−1
)·c j
MC j (Γ
′
j−1
)
and Π
j
i
=
B·M
j
Ci
(Γ′
j−1
)
I (Γ′
j−1
∪{si})
13: end for
14: PΓi ← max j∈[1..ℓ+1]{min{C
j
i
,Π
j
i
}}; PΓ ← PΓ ∪ {PΓi}
15: end for
16: return PΓ
In this, for each doctor si ∈ Γ consider running line 3−9.
Next, determine the largest index ℓ in the sorting of |Γ′|
doctors (determined without si) such that the ratio between
their cost as the initial adapter and budget is less than or
equal to the ratio between their marginal contribution and the
value of the selected subset. Now for each point j ∈ [1. . ℓ+1]
find the maximal cost C
j
i
=M
j
C i
(Γ′
j−1)·
(
c j
MC j (Γ
′
j−1
)
)
that doctor
si can declare in order to be allocated instead of the doctor in
the jth place in the sorting; whereM
j
C i
(Γ′
j−1
) is the marginal
contribution of doctor si when considered on j
th place is
given as: M
j
C i
(Γ′
j−1) = I (Γ
′
j−1 ∪ {si}) − I (Γ
′
j−1). Now, if
this cost does not exceed the threshold payment Π
j
i
= B ·
M
j
Ci
(Γ′
j−1
)
I (Γ′
j−1
∪{si})
then the mechanism will declare si as the leader.
Considering the maximum of the values at j ∈ [1. . ℓ + 1]
results in the payment of si.
Example 1(b): Figure 3 shows the payment calculation of
node 4. So, placing node 4 outside the market and utilizing
line 3 − 9 of Algorithm 4 on the configurations shown in
Figure 3a, Figure 3b, and Figure 3c we find the critical point
as ℓ = 2 (index of node 3).
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(c) Intermediate configuration
min{3, 10}min{2.5, 20
3
}min{8, 4}
62 3
max{3, 2.5, 4} = 4
Payment of node 4 = 4
(d) Payment determination
Figure 3: Payment calculation of node 4
Following Figure 3d at point 1 (index of node 2) the value
C14 = 3 · (
1
1
) = 3, and Π14 = 10 · (
3
3
) = 10. So, min{3, 10} = 3.
Similarly, at point 2 (index of node 3) the value C24 = 2 ·
( 2.5
2
) = 2.5, and Π24 = 10 · (
2
3
) = 6.66. So, min{2.5, 6.66} =
2.5. Considering point 3 (index of the first loser node i.e
node 6) we get C34 = 2 · (
4
1
) = 8, and Π34 = 10 · (
2
5
) = 4. So,
min{8, 4} = 4. The payment of node 4 is max{3, 2.5, 4} = 4.
2) TBC-DS mechanism: For the second fold of the doc-
tors hiring problem, we propose a TBC-DS mechanism
motivated by [16][17].
Allocation rule: In this, firstly the available doctors
are sorted in decreasing order based on quality contribution
by cost. Now, the doctors are greedily selected but will be
hired only when the ratio of the selected doctor’s cost of
consultation and the patient’s budget is less than or equal
to the ratio between the quality contribution by the selected
doctor and the value of the quality of the selected subset.
Algorithm 5 TBC-DS allocation mechanism (Sˆ, B′, C¯)
Output: Υ ← φ.
1: S ort(Sˆ) ⊲ Sorting based on Di(Υi−1)
c¯i
for all si ∈ Sˆ
2: for each si ∈ Sˆ do
3: if c¯i
B
′ ≤
(
Di(Υi−1)
Di(Υi−1)+D(Υi−1)
)
then
4: Υ ← Υ ∪ {si}
5: end if
6: end for
7: return Υ
Example 1(c): Considering the set-up shown in Figure
2a. We have utilized the same cost vector as given in Figure
2. The patient’s budget is given as 8. The quality vector is
given as Q = {5, 1, 3, 5, 4, 5}. The set of nodes informed
by the leaders {4, 3} is given as {3, 5, 6, 4, 1, 2}. So,
the nodes 3, 5, 6, 4, 1, and 2 are sorted based on quality
contribution per cost and is given as: {1, 4, 6, 3, 2, 5}. First
node 1 is considered and the condition 2 ≤ 8· ( 5
5
) for node
1 is satisfied. So, Υ = {1}. Next, node 4 will be considered
and the condition 2 ≤ 8· ( 5
10
) for node 4 is satisfied. So,
Υ = {1, 4}.
Payment rule: The Payment rule is motivated by
[17]. For each si, it is defined as the minimum of the doctor’s
proportional share and the threshold payment. ℓ is the largest
index that satisfies the condition in line 2 of Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 6 TBC-DS Pricing Mechanism (Υ, B′, C¯)
Output: Pˆ ← φ
1: for each si ∈ Υ do
2: Pˆi ← min
{
Di(Υi−1)·B
′∑
i∈ΥD(Υi)
,
Di(Υi−1)·c¯ℓ+1
Dℓ+1(Υℓ)
}
; Pˆ← Pˆ ∪ Pˆi
3: end for
4: return Pˆ
Example 1(d): The payment of doctors in Υ = {1, 4} is:
Pˆ1 = min
{
5×8
10
, 5×4
5
}
= 4 and Pˆ2 = min
{
5×8
10
, 5×4
5
}
= 4.
Lemma 4. The TBC mechanism is computationally efficient.
Proof: In TBC-LI, line 1−5 of Algorithm 3 is bounded
above by m. In Algorithm 4, for each iteration of for loop
line 3−14 is bounded above by m. As we have m iterations in
worst case, we have O(m2). Thus, the running time of TBC-
LI mechanism is O(m2). In TBC-DS, line 1 of Algotrithm
5 takes O(m lgm) time. Line 2 − 6 takes O(m) time. So,
overall running time of Algorithm 5 is O(m lgm) + O(m) =
O(m lgm). Line 1 − 3 of Algorithm 6 takes time O(m).
Thus, running time of TBC-DS mechanism is O(m lgm).
The computational complexity of TBC mechanism is given
as O(m2) + O(m lgm) = O(m2).
V. Analysis of TBC-LI and TBC-DS
Lemma 5. In TBC-LI, the total payment made to the doctors
are within hospital’s budget B.
Proof: The proof is motivated by [16]. As the maximum
payment that any winning EC i can be paid is Πki =
B·MCk (Γi−1)
I (Γi−1∪{i})
. The total payment of the ECs as leaders i.e. T P
I
is given as:
T P
I
=
∑
i∈Sˆ
Pi =
k∑
i=1
B ·
MCi (Γi−1)
I (Γi−1 ∪ {si})
=
k∑
i=1
B ·
MCi (Γi−1)
I (Γi)
≤
B
I(Γk)
·
k∑
i=1
MCi (Γi−1) =
B
I (Γk)
·
k∑
i=1
I (Γi−1 ∪ {si})︸           ︷︷           ︸
Informed ECs
by set Γi
− I (Γi−1)︸  ︷︷  ︸
Informed ECs
by set Γi−1
=
B
I (Γk)
·
k∑
i=1
I (Γi)︸︷︷︸
Informed
ECs by
set Γi
− I (Γi−1)︸  ︷︷  ︸
Informed ECs
by set Γi−1
⇒ T P
I
≤ B
Hence, it is proved that the incentive compatible total
payment do not exceed the budget.
Lemma 6. In TBC-LI mechanism, if any doctor si comes
ahead of its current position say i′ < i by declaring a cost
ci′ < ci then,
B
2
(
MCi′ (Γi′−1)
MCi′ (Γi′−1) + I(Γi′−1)
)
>
B
2
(
MCi (Γi−1)
MCi (Γi−1) + I(Γi−1)
)
Proof: If the EC i by reporting ci′ moves at position i
′
such that i′ < i as depicted in Figure 4 below:
❡❡ ❄❄ ❄ ❄✉✉✉✉
ii − 1i′i′ − 1
cici−1ci′ci′−1
Figure 4: Pictorial representation
From the definition of I(·) we can say: I(Γi′−1) < I(Γi−1).
As the set Γi′−1 is smaller as compared to the set Γi−1, so
from the definition of the monotone sub-modular marginal
contribution property, it can be said:
MCi′ (Γi′−1)︸        ︷︷        ︸
Marginal contribution
of i′ given Γi′−1
> MCi (Γi−1)︸      ︷︷      ︸
Marginal contribution
of i given Γi−1
(1)
The number of ECs leaders by the set Γi′ will be less than
the number of ECs leaders by Γi. Mathematically,
MCi′ (Γi′−1)︸        ︷︷        ︸
Marginal contribution
of i′ given Γi′−1
+I(Γi′−1) < MCi (Γi−1)︸      ︷︷      ︸
Marginal contribution
of i given Γi−1
+I(Γi−1)
1
MCi′ (Γi′−1) + I(Γi′−1)
>
1
MCi (Γi−1) + I (Γi−1)
(2)
Combining equation 1, equation 2 and multiplying both side
by B
2
, we get
B
2
(
MCi′ (Γi′−1)
MCi′ (Γi′−1) + I(Γi′−1)
)
>
B
2
(
MCi (Γi−1)
MCi (Γi−1) + I(Γi−1)
)
Hence, it is proved.
Theorem 1. TBC-LI mechanism is monotone.
Proof: Fix i, c−i, ci, and ci′ . For mechanism TBC-LI
mechanism to be monotone, we need to show that, any
winning EC i with private cost ci will still be considered in
the winning set of ECs when declaring ci′ such that ci′ < ci
or any losing EC i with private cost ci will still be considered
in the losing set of ECs when declaring ci′ such that ci′ > ci.
The proof is divided into two cases.
Case 1. In this case, the ith winning EC deviates and reveals
a cost of consultation ci′ < ci. Again two cases can happen.
If the EC i shows a small deviation in his/her (henceforth
his) cost ci i.e. ci′ such that ci′ < ci and the current position
of the EC i remains unchanged. In this situation, it can still
be considered in the winning set. It is to be noted that, if
the EC i reports a large deviation in his cost ci i.e. ci′ such
that ci′ < ci, then in this case by definition:
MC1 (Γ0)
c1
≥
MC2 (Γ1)
c2
≥
MC3 (Γ2)
c3
≥ . . . ≥
MCn (Γn−1)
cn
EC i will be placed some position ahead (say i′) of its current
position say i i.e. i′ < i. This scenario is depicted in Figure
5 below.
❡❡ ❄❄ ❄ ❄✉✉✉✉
ii − 1i′i′ − 1
cici−1ci′ci′−1
Figure 5: Pictorial representation
From Lemma 6 it can be said that if EC i is placed some
position ahead by revealing a cost ci′ < ci then it must satisfy
MCi′ (Γi′−1)
MCi′ (Γi′−1) + I (Γi′−1)
>
MCi (Γi−1)
MCi(Γi−1) + I (Γi−1)
(3)
Let us suppose for the sake of contradiction that, when the
EC i ∈ S comes ahead in ordering say at some position i′
such that ci′ < ci, then it is not considered in the winning
set of the EC because it is not satisfying the given budget.
If this is the case, then it means that:
ci′ >
B
2
(
MCi′ (Γi′−1)
MCi′ (Γi′−1) + I (Γi′−1)
)
(4)
Combining our assumption ci′ < ci and equation 4 it can be
concluded that:
B
2
(
MCi′ (Γi′−1)
MCi′ (Γi′−1) + I(Γi′−1)
)
< ci′ < ci (5)
Using condition in line 2 of Algorithm 3 and equation 5, we
can say that:
B
2
(
MCi′ (Γi′−1)
MCi′ (Γi′−1) + I(Γi′−1)
)
< ci′ < ci <
B
2
(
MCi (Γi−1)
MCi (Γi−1) + I(Γi−1)
)
⇒
B
2
(
MCi′ (Γi′−1)
MCi′ (Γi′−1) + I(Γi′−1)
)
<
B
2
(
MCi (Γi−1)
MCi (Γi−1) + I(Γi−1)
)
⇒
MCi′ (Γi′−1)
MCi′ (Γi′−1) + I (Γi′−1)
<
MCi (Γi−1)
MCi (Γi−1) + I (Γi−1)
So, it is a contradiction.
Case 2. In this case, the ith losing EC deviates and reveals
a cost of consultation ci′ > ci. Again two cases can happen.
If the EC i shows a small deviation in his/her (henceforth
his) cost ci i.e. ci′ such that ci′ > ci and the current position
of the EC i remains unchanged. In this situation, it will be
considered in the losing set. It is to be noted that, if the
EC i reports a large deviation in his cost ci i.e. ci′ such that
ci′ > ci, then in this case by definition:
MC1(Γ0)
c1
≥
MC2(Γ1)
c2
≥
MC3(Γ2)
c3
≥ . . . ≥
MCn(Γn−1)
cn
EC i will be placed some position ahead (say i′) of its current
position say i i.e. i′ > i. This scenario is depicted in Figure
6 below.
❡❡ ❄❄ ❄ ❄✉✉✉✉
ii′ − 1ii − 1
ci′ci′−1cici−1
Figure 6: Pictorial representation
Analogous to the statement given in Lemma 6 it can be
said that if EC i is placed some position ahead by revealing
a cost ci′ > ci then it must satisfy
MC i′ (Γi′−1)
MCi′ (Γi′−1) + I (Γi′−1)
<
MC i (Γi−1)
MCi (Γi−1) + I (Γi−1)
(6)
Let us suppose for the sake of contradiction that, when the
EC i ∈ S comes ahead in ordering say at some position i′
such that c′
i
> ci, then it is not considered in the losing set
of the EC because it is satisfying the given budget. If this
is the case, then it means that:
ci′ <
B
2
(
MC i′ (Γi′−1)
MCi′ (Γi′−1) + I(Γi′−1)
)
(7)
Combining our assumption ci′ > ci and equation 7 it can be
concluded that:
B
2
(
MCi′ (Γi′−1)
MC i′ (Γi′−1) + I(Γi′−1)
)
> ci′ > ci (8)
Using condition in line 2 of Algorithm 3 and equation 8, we
can say that:
B
2
(
MCi′ (Γi′−1)
MC i′ (Γi′−1) + I(Γi′−1)
)
> ci′ > ci >
B
2
(
MCi (Γi−1)
MCi (Γi−1) + I(Γi−1)
)
⇒
B
2
(
MCi′ (Γi′−1)
MCi′ (Γi′−1) + I(Γi′−1)
)
>
B
2
(
MCi (Γi−1)
MCi (Γi−1) + I(Γi−1)
)
⇒
MCi′ (Γi′−1)
MCi′ (Γi′−1) + I (Γi′−1)
>
MCi (Γi−1)
MCi (Γi−1) + I (Γi−1)
So, it is a contradiction.
Hence, the theorem is proved.
Theorem 2. In TBC-DS, the function D : 2S ⇒ R≥0 is:
(a) monotone: If S ⊆ F then D(S) ≤D(F ), and
(b) submodular: IfD(S∪{i})−D(S) ≥ D(F ∪{i})−D(F )
∀S ⊆ F .
Proof: To prove that the function is indeed monotone,
let us suppose for the sake of contradiction that, if S ⊆ F
then D(S) > D(F ). From the definition of quality function,
we can say D(S) > D(F )=
∑
i∈S Qi >
∑
i∈F Qi. It is to be
noted that under the given condition S ⊆ F , the sum of all
the Q′
i
s over the set F will be greater than the sum of all the
Q′
i
s over the set S i.e.
∑
i∈S Qi ≤
∑
i∈F Qi. So, the inequality
D(S) > D(F ) =
∑
i∈S Qi >
∑
i∈F Qi cannot be true. Our
assumption contradicts. Hence, the inequality if S ⊆ F then
D(S) ≤ D(F ) holds and the given function is monotone.
To prove that the function is submodular, as a thought
experiment one can say that adding the same quantity i.e. in
this case the quality value of any agent si to the sets having
relation S ⊆ F will reflect the contribution by any agent si
more in S than in F . This completes the proof.
Theorem 3. TBC-LI is truthful.
Proof: Fix EC j, c− j, c j, and c j′ . For TBC-LI mecha-
nism to be truthful, we need to show that, it is not beneficial
for any EC j to underbid or overbid say c j′ such that c j′ < c j
or c j′ > c j respectively. For each of the above possible
scenarios, the proof is divided into two cases. Before going
into the different cases let’s consider the case where the EC
j is reporting his true cost c j. The pictorial representation of
the possible set-up with n ECs are shown in Figure 7.
1 2 i j
c1 c2 ci cj
k
1 2 i j
c1 c2 ci cj+1
k
(with EC j)
(without EC j)
n− 1
cn−1
n− 1
cn
n
cn
Figure 7: Pictorial representation
The values from 1 to n represents the position (or index).
Currently, our analysis lies around the index k and k + 1;
where k denote the index of the last EC ℓ that respects the
allocation condition given in line 2 of Algorithm 3. As the
ECs are sorted based on the marginal contribution per cost,
so we can write
MC i(Γi−1)
ci
≥
MC j (Γi−1)
c j
⇒ c j ≥
MC j (Γi−1) · ci
MCi (Γi−1)
(9)
By using line 12 of algorithm 4 and equation 9 it can be
easily seen that, c j ≥ C
i
j. If this is the case then we can say
c j ≥ Π
i
j. In order to be allocated EC j must satisfy C
i
j ≤ Π
i
j
otherwise Cij > Π
i
j means not allocated. As we are taking
the payment as:
• If C ij = Π
i
j ⇒ PΓ j = min{C
i
j,Π
i
j} = Π
i
j = C
i
j ≤ c j
• If C ij > Π
i
j ⇒ PΓ j = min{C
i
j,Π
i
j} = Π
i
j = Π
i
j ≤ c j
• If C ij < Π
i
j ⇒ PΓ j = min{C
i
j,Π
i
j} = C
i
j ≤ c j
If this is the case, then it can be concluded that C ij ≤ c j or
Π
i
j ≤ c j. As the payment is less than the actual cost. Hence
not allocated. Coming back to our underbid and overbid
cases.
Scenario 1: Underbidding (c j′ < c j): In this case, the
jth EC deviates and reveals a cost of consultation c j′ < c j.
This scenario give rise to two cases.
Case 1:When EC j is in losing set.: If the EC j shows
a small deviation in his/her (henceforth his) cost i.e. c j′ such
1 2 i− 1 i
c1 c2 ci−1 ci
k
1 2 i j
c1 c2 ci cj
k
(with EC j, reporting truthfully)
(with EC j, misreporting)
1 2 i j
c1 c2 ci cj+1
(without EC j )
p
cj′
cn
n
cn
n
n− 1
cn
Figure 8: Pictorial representation
that c j′ < c j and the current position of the EC j remains
unchanged. In this situation, it can still be considered in the
losing set. It is to be noted that, if the EC j reports a large
deviation in his cost c j i.e. c j′ in this case it will belong to
winning set and will appear before EC i as shown in Figure
8. As the ECs are sorted based on the marginal contribution
per cost, so we can write:
MC j (Γi−1)
c j′
≥
MC i (Γi−1)
ci
⇒ c j′ ≤
MC j (Γi−1) · ci
MCi (Γi−1)
and c j′ ≤
MC j (Γi−1)·ci
MCi (Γi−1)
= C ij because from above we have got
the relation C ij ≤ c j. This will lead to c j′ ≤ C
i
j ≤ c j. The EC
j is paid less than the actual cost.
Case 2: When EC j is in winning set.: If the EC j
shows a deviation in his cost such that c j′ < c j it will still
belong to winning set and will appear before EC i as shown
in Figure 9. As the ECs are sorted based on the marginal
contribution per cost, so we can write:
MC j (Γl−1)
c j
≥
MC i (Γi−1)
ci
⇒ c j ≤
MC j (Γl−1) · ci
MC i(Γi−1)
= C lj
and for the case when the EC j deviates, then
MC j (Γt−1)
c j′
≥
MCi (Γi−1)
ci
⇒ c j′ ≤
MC j (Γt−1) · ci
MCi (Γi−1)
= C lj
From above two equations it is clear that no matter what
cost EC j is bidding, he will still be winning and be paid
an amount Clj. Hence, considering Case 1 and Case 2 it
can be concluded that EC j does not gain by underbidding
there true cost. In similar fashion, we can write the above
mentioned equation for any position i before k and in the
same way we can prove that Cij ≤ c j.
1 2 l
c1 c2 cj
k
i j
ci ci+1
1 2 l
c1 c2 cj
k
i j
ci ci+1cj′
t
(EC j reporting truthfully)
(EC j misreporting)
1 2
c1 c2
i+ 1 i+ 2
ci+1 ci+2
(without EC j)
cn
n
cn
n
cn
n− 1
ci
i
k
Figure 9: Pictorial representation
Scenario 2: Overbidding (c j′ > c j): In this case, the
jth EC deviates and reveals a cost of consultation c j′ > c j.
This scenario gives rise to two cases.
Case 1: When EC j is in losing set.: If the EC j shows
a small deviation in his/her (henceforth his) cost i.e. c j′ such
that c j′ > c j and the current position of the EC j remains
unchanged. In this situation, it can still be considered in the
losing set.
1 2 i j
c1 c2 ci cj
k
1 2 i j
c1 c2 ci cj+1
k
l
cj′
(with EC j, reporting truthfully)
(with EC j, misreporting)
1 2 i j
c1 c2 ci cj+1
k
(without EC j)
n
cn
n
cn
cn
n− 1
Figure 10: Pictorial representation
It is to be noted that, if the EC j reports a large deviation
in his cost c j i.e. c j′ in this case it will belong to losing set
and will still appear after EC i as shown in Figure 10. As
the ECs are sorted based on the marginal contribution per
cost, so we can write:
MCi (Γi−1)
ci
≥
MC j (Γi−1)
ci
⇒ c j′ ≤
MC j (Γi−1) · ci
MCi (Γi−1)
and c j′ ≤
MC j (Γi−1)·ci
MCi (Γi−1)
= C ij. From above we have got the
relation C ij ≤ c j. This will lead to c j′ ≤ C
i
j ≤ c j. The EC j
is paid less than the actual cost.
Case 2: When EC j is in winning set.: If the EC j
shows a deviation in his cost such that c j′ > c j and the
current position of the EC j remains unchanged. In this
situation, it can still be considered in the winning set. It
is to be noted that, if the EC j reports a large deviation in
his cost c j i.e. c j′ in this case it will belong to losing set
and will appear after EC i as shown in Figure 11. Utilizing
the definition of the marginal contribution per cost sorting
and figure above:
MC j (Γl−1)
c j
≥
MC i (Γi−1)
ci
⇒ c j ≤
MC j (Γl−1) · ci
MC i(Γi−1)
= C lj
and for the case when the EC j deviates, then
MCi (Γi−1)
ci
≥
MC j (Γt−1)
c j′
⇒ c j′ ≥
MC j (Γt−1) · ci
MCi (Γi−1)
= C lj
Now, if EC j deviates by large amount then it will belong
to the losing set. From above two equations it is clear that
no matter what cost EC j is bidding, he will be paid C lj.
1 2 l
c1 c2 cj
k
i i+ 1
ci ci+1
1 2 l
c1 c2 cj
i+ 1
ci+1 cj′
t
n
cn
ci
i
k
cn
n
1 2
c1 c2
i+ 1
ci+1ci
i
k
cn
n− 1
(with EC j, reporting truthfully)
(with EC j, misreporting)
(without EC j)
Figure 11: Pictorial representation
Hence, considering Case 1 and Case 2 it can be concluded
that EC j does not gain by overbidding there true cost. In
similar fashion, we can write the above mentioned equation
for any position i before k and in the same way we can
prove that C ij ≤ c j. Hence, max operator will still endure
that if any agent j deviates and wins, then his payment will
be less than the true cost and hence deviation may not give
any gain.
Hence, the theorem is proved.
VI. Performance Evaluation
We compared our proposed mechanisms against the
benchmark mechanism (random mechanism). In this,
the doctors are selected randomly and are paid their declared
cost. We have utilized the coverage model for the first fold
of our hiring problem. The performance metric includes the
Interested doctors set size, and Number of
doctors hired. The unit of cost and budget is $.
A. Simulation set-up
For our simulation purpose, a social graph is generated
randomly using Networkx package of python. It consists of
1000 nodes (doctors) and approximately 28,250
edges. The maximum and minimum degree a node can
have is 10% and 1% of the total available nodes respec-
tively. The cost of each node as initial adapter is uniformly
distributed over [30, 50], the cost of consultancy is uniformly
distributed over [35, 50], and quality is uniformly distributed
over [20, 50]. The budget is considered in range [100, 1000].
B. Result analysis
The simulation results shown in Figure 12 shows the
comparison of the interested doctors set size i.e. the number
of doctors acting as leaders and the number of doctors
informed by the leaders about the hiring concept.
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Figure 12: Interested doctors set
size with budget B ∈ [100, 1000]
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Figure 13: Hired doctors with bud-
get B′ ∈ [100, 1000]
It is seen in Figure 12 that the interested doctors set size in
case of NoTBC mechanism is higher than TBC mechanism
and random mechanism. This nature of NoTBC mechanism
is obvious due to the fact that the mechanisms (NoTBC-LI
and NoTBC-DS) are utilizing almost the complete quota of
the available budgets whereas TBC mechanism is utilizing
only a part of total budget. With the increase in budget,
one can easily see the increasing gap between NoTBC
mechanism and TBC mechanism. It can be seen evidently in
Figure 13 that the number of doctors hired in case of NoTBC
mechanism is higher than TBC mechanism and random
mechanism. Similar reasoning can be given as above.
VII. Conclusions and future works
In this paper, we have addressed the problem of hiring
the doctors from outside of the hospital when a patient is
constrained by budget. Designing a more general mechanism
in this environment for the set-up consisting of multiple pa-
tients say n (each patient is associated to different hospitals)
and m doctors can be thought of as the future work.
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